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The Cliometrics of International Migration: A Survey
* 
 
This is a survey of some of the key studies in the literature on international migration in 
history that may be described as cliometric. This literature uses the concepts and approaches 
of applied economics to investigate a range of historical issues and there are strong parallels 
with the questions that have been addressed in the literature on contemporary migrations. 
Here I focus on the period 1850 to 1940 and chiefly on migration from Europe to the New 
World. The survey is organised around six themes that include: the forces driving migration, 
over time and across space; the assimilation of migrants and their effects on wages and 
income distribution in source and destination countries; and the evolution of immigration 
policy. While this literature has drawn heavily on the tool kit of applied economists it also 
provides a wider perspective on many of the issues that concern migration today. 
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This survey provides an overview of the quantitative historical literature on international 
migration that has developed over the last 30 years or so. I focus on those contributions that 
are classified as ‘cliometric’ in the sense that they use explicit theoretical models and/or use 
econometric methods, or are to some degree quantitative. This historical literature has 
flourished side by side with a burgeoning literature on contemporary migration issues. As I 
will show, the historical literature has borrowed from, and has often been stimulated by, the 
work of economists concerned with current policy issues. But the traffic is not all one way.  
I concentrate on six key themes that that have been the subject of both historical and 
contemporary analysis. The first is to account for the trends and fluctuations in established 
migration streams. This was the focus of much of the early quantitative literature that 
followed from debates over the links between migration and business cycles, but which has 
not featured quite so prominently in the analysis of economists. The key issues there are 
whether push or pull forces dominate in migration and what other variables matter. The 
second theme asks who migrated and why? Why does the propensity to migrate differ across 
countries, regions, towns and villages and how does it vary between individuals?  This 
literature seeks not only to understand what motivates migrants but also the forces that 
initiate migration streams, and what mechanisms cause them to persist.  
While the first two themes concentrate on the causes of migration, the next two focus on the 
results of migration, particularly in the receiving countries. The third theme is immigrant 
assimilation. This has been one of the most fiercely debated issues among economists and it 
is the one where economic historians have borrowed most from the contemporary literature. 
The fourth theme is the effects of migration on the economy at large and in particular on the 
wages and living standards of those in the receiving country with whom migrants compete. 
Did mass migration foster wage convergence between sending and receiving countries? And 
how did it affect income distributions and skill premia? These too are highly contentious 
issues in the literature on recent migrations and no less so in the historical context.  
The last two themes are areas where the cliometric literature is still relatively thin but which 
have attracted growing interest in recent years. The fifth theme is the political economy of 
immigration policy. This literature seeks to understand the forces that led to the adoption 
increasingly restrictive immigration policies in the half century after 1890. Can this be 
interpreted as a backlash to growing immigration pressures? And if so, what political-
economy mechanisms were at work? The final theme is the study of international migration 
outside the traditional focus of European migration to the New World. As has often been 
noted, migration from and within Asia was even larger than emigration from Europe. While 
there is a rich historical literature that documents and discusses Asian migration, until 
recently, it has not featured widely in cliometric research.  
As with any survey article, much has to be omitted. I focus chiefly on migration from Europe 
to the New World, from the mid-nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, 
which is where the bulk of the cliometric literature has concentrated. As a result I ignore the 3 
 
lively, but somewhat independent literature in the slave trade and I omit the significant 
literature on migration under indentured servitude before the mid-nineteenth century.  I 
concentrate largely on intercontinental migration, leaving aside the literature on rural-urban, 
inter-regional and cross-border migration, a literature so rich and extensive as to deserve 
separate treatment.   
 
Push and Pull  
The earliest cliometric analyses focused on whether fluctuations in international migration 
streams were driven chiefly by ‘push’ factors operating at home or ‘pull’ effects from abroad. 
It originated in the debate between Jerome (1926) who argued that the timing of US 
immigration before 1914 was dominated by the American business cycle and Thomas (1941) 
who, in the context of Swedish migration, stressed the effect of home country factors. The 
literature that followed was facilitated by the monumental work of Ferenczi and Willcox 
(1929), which provided a rich time series database on emigration from Europe and 
immigration to the New World from the middle of the nineteenth century to the 1920s. The 
literature that subsequently developed in the 1960s and 1970s was critically reviewed as part 
of an excellent series of articles by Gould (1979). 
The typical study in this genre specified a regression for the aggregate migration flow (or 
rate) from a source country to a destination country as a function of business cycle indicators 
(such as industrial output gaps or unemployment rates) at home and abroad and some 
measure of wage rates or incomes at home and abroad. These models are often estimated with 
lags to capture adjustment dynamics and sometimes also include a measure of the stock of 
previous migrants. In his critique of the earlier literature Gould pointed out that, where both 
home and foreign business cycle indicators are included, the latter typically dominate in 
terms of size and significance of the coefficients. He also noted that indicators of wage or 
incomes often fail to achieve significance in the present of business cycle indicators and 
typically fail to support the view that the incentive to migrate is positively related to incomes 
abroad and negatively to incomes at home. He concluded that: “By and large, reaction to this 
literature is one of some disappointment, for not only has it failed to generate important new 
insights...... it has had only limited success in confirming or denying old interpretations” 
(Gould, 1979, p. 668).  
An important shortcoming in the studies reviewed by Gould is that they lack a coherent 
economic model of the emigration decision, which makes the results difficult to interpret. It is 
hard to believe that the decision to emigrate depends only cyclical conditions at the 
destination or, for that matter, exclusively on conditions at home (except perhaps in the case 
of war or famine).  Similarly, emigration decisions must have been based on some 
comparison, however approximate, between wage rates or expected incomes at home and 
abroad, especially in the long run. Accordingly, Hatton (1995) developed a model of the 
migration decision using a simple microeconomic framework in which potential migrants 
base their decision on the comparison of future expected incomes at home and abroad. 4 
 
Following Todaro (1969) expected income at a given location depends on the probability of 
employment and the wage rate. Because migrants are risk averse and because greater 
uncertainty attaches to the employment probabilities than to the wage rates, the former takes 
a larger ‘weight’ in the migration function.  Dynamics are accounted for by an adaptive 
expectations process and the model also includes the migrant stock to represent the so-called 
friends and relatives effect. 
1 
This model provides a benchmark for the evaluating the relationship among the coefficients 
attached to different variables in an econometric model of emigration. Estimates on annual 
time series for gross emigration from the UK between 1870 and 1913 broadly support these 
priors.  Specifically they show that wage rates and employment rates, both at home and 
abroad all matter, with the coefficients on the employment rates exceeding those on wage 
rates. While short run fluctuations are largely driven by employment or activity rates (which 
typically are not trended), long run trends are determined by relative wage rates and the trend 
in the migrant stock, which is itself determined by previous emigration.  Applying the same 
model to emigration from Ireland, Hatton and Williamson (1998, p. 83) found that the 17 
percent fall in the (foreign to home) wage ratio between 1876/80 and 1909/13 accounted for a 
decline of 4 per thousand in the emigration rate. Over the same period the fall in the ratio of 
the migrant stock to home population contributed a similar amount to the fall in the 
emigration rate.  
When it has been included in time series models, the migrant stock almost always proves to 
be very powerful. This is often interpreted as evidence of migrant networks generating strong 
persistence through chain migration. But as the migrant stock is essentially the cumulative 
flow it is sometimes difficult to distinguish network effects from the equation dynamics. In 
particular, if it is more recent immigrants that matter, then lags of the dependent variable may 
be picking up these effects. One important mechanism is the flow of remittances, a significant 
part of which took the form of pre-paid tickets and other assistance to new migrants. Magee 
and Thompson (2006a) provide new estimates of the flow of remittances to the UK from 
1875 to 1913, which amounted to 3.4 percent of the value of exports in the latter year. Magee 
and Thompson (2006b) study the determinants of the flow of money orders, which they find 
to depend on the migrant stock and income in the migrant-receiving country. This would be 
                                                            
1 The model is derived from a logarithmic utility function and assumes that future expected values of the wage 
and of employment probabilities are related with geometric lags to past values in an adaptive process. This gives 
the following model for migration (see Hatton and Williamson, 1998, pp. 61-63 for the full derivation): 
                               Mt = (1−λ)βln(wf/wh)t + (1−λ)β
3/2ln(ef)t − (1−λ)βγ
3/2ln(eh)t   
                                     + (1−λ)βε0 + (1−λ)βε1MSTt + (1−λ)βε2t + λMt-1 
where M is the emigration rate, w denotes wage rates and, e, employment rates abroad (f) and at home (h). The 
terms in the lower line of the equation (with parameters ε) are the costs of migration as reflected by the migrant 
stock (MST) and a time trend for falling transport costs. The last term is the lagged dependent variable arising 
from the adaptive expectations process with parameter λ. In the upper line of the equation, the fraction 
3/2 
reflects the greater weight given to the employment terms as a result of employment uncertainty (arising from 
the concavity of the utility function). The coefficient γ allows for lower uncertainty to attach to home 
employment as compared with abroad. Thus it could range between 1 (equal uncertainty with abroad) and 
2/3 
(no uncertainty). Further dynamics are added to the estimating equation to reflect the option value of waiting--
see Hatton (1995). 5 
 
consistent with the idea that the effect of these variables on the flow of new migrants works 
partly through remittances.  
A number of studies have identified other variables that determine trends and variations in 
time series migration rates. One important variable is the age structure of the population. 
Since the potential gains from migration are greater at younger ages demographic structure 
should matter independently of other variables in the model.
2 Quigley (1972) found that 
demographic forces mattered for emigration from Sweden as did Larsen (1982) for Denmark. 
Using the rate of natural increase 25 years earlier as a proxy for the size of the birth cohort, 
Hatton and Williamson (1998, p. 72) find similar results for three Scandinavian countries. 
They estimate that between 1895 and 1905 lagged natural increase raised the emigration rate 
by 1 per thousand in Sweden, by 1.3 per thousand in Norway and by 0.3 per thousand in 
Denmark. However, these effects were weaker for countries such as Spain and Italy (Sánchez 
Alonso 2000b; Hatton and Williamson, 1998, p. 104). Interestingly, Greenwood (2007) finds 
that a higher current birth rate tends to reduce emigration of those at parenting age, probably 
reflecting the higher cost of family emigration. Overall, these studies offer some support for 
the hypothesis that demographic structure was an important determinant of emigration.   
Any sensible economic model of migration must take account of the costs as well as the 
benefits. The costs of migration have been absent from most studies, because of the lack of 
suitable time series data. Yet there is reason to think they are important, and a full accounting 
of the costs would include not only the costs of an ocean passage, but also the overland costs 
at each end of the journey, and the living costs (or foregone income) while in transit.  The 
cost of passage fell after 1850 with the transition from sail to steam, a decline that occurred 
later on the longer routes.
3 And effective prices fell rather more steeply because of shorter 
passage times and better quality on-board accommodation (Keeling, 1999a; Sánchez Alonso 
2007), not to mention overland travel. On the routes to North America there were sharp 
swings in passage prices associated with the effectiveness of shipping cartels (Keeling 
1999b). Deltas et al. (2008) estimate the effects of cartels on quarterly data for the volume of 
migration on different shipping routes to the US and Canada between 1899 and 1911. Periods 
when cartels were in operation were associated with lower emigration, implying a price 
elasticity of about -0.7. 
Policy related variables also influenced the costs of migration, either directly or indirectly. 
Some receiving countries such as Australia and Brazil directly encouraged immigration by 
providing assisted passages to selected groups of migrants. The programme of assisted 
passages in Australia substantially reduced the costs for UK migrants in 1911-13, and Pope 
                                                            
2 To illustrate, let the wage difference (destination minus source country) per year of working life be a constant 
D. If the age range of potential working-age migrants, a, runs from 20 to 65, and the discount rate is r, then the 




a () ( )
() =− +
−− 11
46 , which is a decreasing function of a.  
 
3 Sánchez-Alonso (2007) shows that fares from the UK to the USA fell from the 1850s, while those from Spain 
to Argentina, Brazil and Cuba declined from the 1870s.  McDonald and Shlomowitz (1991) find no downward 
trend in the contract price of passages to Australia between 1847 and 1885.  6 
 
(1981) found that this accounted for much of the surge in immigration in those years. For 
emigrants from Spain, the depreciation of the Peseta after 1892 sharply increased the costs of 
migration, which were denominated in gold currencies. Sánchez-Alonso (2000a) finds that 
the exchange rate had a negative effect on emigration from Spain, such that emigration would 
have been as much as 40 percent higher between 1892 and 1905 in the absence of the 
depreciation.  By contrast, tariff protection increased emigration by more than 20 percent. On 
a more speculative level, Khoudor Castéras (2008) argues that, for Germany, the rise of 
social insurance and the fall in working hours contributed to the decline in the emigration rate 
from the 1880s. 
Overall the push-pull model of international migration has worked pretty well on a variety of 
time series for different migration streams.
4 But one issue that remains is why migration 
flows were so volatile. Emigration rates often increased or fell by a quarter or even a half in a 
year or two, only to recover again a few years later. In the time series models much of the 
volatility is explained by the cyclical employment variables and the equation dynamics. But 
this is itself a puzzle. Given that migration decisions were based on comparing future 
expected lifetime earning profiles, one might expect that short run changes, quickly reversed, 
would have little effect. One reason for the surprising short run volatility is the option value 
of waiting. While it might be worth emigrating today even though unemployment was high in 
the destination, it would be better still to wait a year or two if conditions were expected to 
improve. While it is tempting to think that emigrants timed their moves in order to maximise 
the life cycle benefits overall, we have little direct evidence for this.
5  
   
Source Countries, Regions and Localities.  
A greater challenge is to explain the differences in the levels and the trends in emigration 
rates across countries. There was certainly a wide variety of emigration rates from European 
countries in the late nineteenth century. The highest overall was Ireland where the annual 
gross emigration rate averaged 12 per thousand of the population between 1850 and 1913. 
Countries such as Sweden and Norway had rates approaching 5 per thousand between 1870 
and 1913; the rates for Germany and Belgium were under two per thousand, while that for 
France was less than one per thousand. Furthermore the long run trends in emigration 
differed widely: the Irish emigration rate declined from the 1860s and the German and 
Norwegian rates declined from the 1880s. But at almost the same time the Italian and Spanish 
emigration rates began a steep ascent which was halted only by the outbreak of War, and a 
similar pattern is observed for a number of Eastern European countries.  
One important stylised fact is that during the onset of modern economic growth in Europe, 
national emigration rates often rose, steeply at first from very low levels, rising more gently 
                                                            
4 For example, Taylor (1994) finds that similar results emerge for migration to Argentina (largely from Italy and 
Spain) as for migration to Australia (from the U.K.).  
5 For example, Deltas et al. (2008) found little evidence of inter-temporal substitution in response to shifts in the 
cost of migration.  7 
 
to a peak, and then gradually falling. This evolution, often seen as a multi stage process, has 
sometimes been called the ‘mobility transition’ (Zelinski, 1971). Though not universal, such 
patterns have been identified in studies of aggregate emigration rates from a number of 
countries (Akerman, 1976, p. 25; Hatton and Williamson, 1998, p. 47). In his pioneering 
study of European emigration rates, Easterlin (1961) stressed the effects of population growth 
spilling over into emigration. On the other hand Tomaske (1971) found little effect for source 
country per capita income on cross country emigration rates. Thus income or real wage 
differences alone can explain little of the cross country variation in emigration rates—their 
effects can only be observed in the presence of other variables. But the early studies of 
emigration across countries and over time were constrained by lack of suitable data. The 
development of internationally comparable data such as Williamson’s (1995) database on real 
wages in Europe and the New World gave a fillip to further research. 
Hatton and Williamson (1998) studied decade-average emigration rates from 12 European 
countries between 1860 and 1913 using a limited set of explanatory variables. In this analysis 
the real wage ratio (source to destination) has the expected negative effect. A ten percent 
increase in the wage ratio reduced emigration in the long run by 1.27 per thousand per 
annum—a substantial effect that is broadly consistent with the results from annual time 
series. But the share of the labour force in agriculture had only a weak negative effect—
suggesting that, on balance, agricultural populations were less mobile than urban/industrial 
populations.
6 The effect of lagged natural increase strongly supports Easterlin’s view that the 
demographic transition drove emigration. This estimate suggests that half of excess births 
spilled over into emigration—a very large effect indeed and one deserving further 
investigation.  
It has often been observed that emigration gathered momentum first in the richer countries of 
Europe and, as it spread to the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, it often coincided 
with a quickening in the pace of development. It has been argued that those with the greatest 
incentive to migrate were initially too poor to afford the costs of long-distance migration but 
economic development served to ease this ‘poverty trap’. Using annual time series, Faini and 
Venturini (1994) find for Italy, and Sánchez Alonso (2000b) finds for Spain, that the rise in 
emigration after 1880 was positively influenced by per capita income at home. For Italy, the 
gradual increase in the migrant stock also helped to ease the poverty trap as previous 
migrants helped to finance the passage of subsequent cohorts of migrants (Moretti, 1999). 
Thus the poverty trap would have been less binding the higher was the pre-existing migrant 
stock (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 65). In Ireland, the large migrant stock inherited from 
the Famine era meant that the poverty trap was much less binding from mid-century than it 
was for countries with fewer past emigrants. In contrast to Italy, the Irish emigration rate fell 
as conditions at home improved because the declining incentive to emigrate dominated the 
growing capacity to emigrate.     
                                                            
6 Looking at panel data for the same 12 countries Greenwood (2007) finds that the larger the manufacturing and 
agricultural shares in total employment the younger were the emigrants and the more they responded to job 
opportunities.  8 
 
The wide diversity of regional emigration rates within any given country and their apparent 
convergence over time presents a similar puzzle. Gould (1980b) argued that this was due to a 
process of information diffusion, often originating from ports or trade routes, but as 
information is not directly measurable, this is rather hard to test formally. Baines (1994, p. 
532) has argued that convergence was not universal among regional emigration rates in 
different European countries. Clearly, in some countries where emigration was relatively well 
established, the information diffusion hypothesis would have less force. Thus, across the 32 
Irish counties, the coefficient of variation in emigration rates rose from 0.31 in 1881 to 0.71 
in 1901, falling back to 0.41 in 1911. By contrast in Italy and Spain there was strong 
convergence. While greater literacy might have been expected to foster the flow of 
information, evidence for Italian provinces and for Irish counties indicates that emigration 
rates were not positively associated with literacy (Hatton and Williamson, 1998, Chs. 5 and 
6). But, looking across Spanish provinces in 1888 and 1911, Sánchez Alonso (2000b) finds 
that the growth in literacy had positive effects on the emigration rate.  
Studies of emigration across regions find that the degree of urbanisation has mixed effects 
(e.g. Lowell, 1987, pp. 48-52, 217-8). While urban populations were typically more mobile, 
they also enjoyed higher incomes than did rural dwellers. Key factors in rural areas include 
local demographic growth, which is almost always positive, and the patterns of landholding, 
which seems to have had different effects in different countries. For Norway and Sweden, 
Lowell (1987, pp. 212-16, 221) found that emigration was negatively related to local wage 
rates, but also positively related to the number of landless labourers and the share of land 
occupied by large estates. For Ireland, Hatton and Williamson (1998) found that the 
prevalence of smallholdings had a negative effect on emigration while measures of poverty 
had positive effects. Thus attachment to small parcels of land kept the Irish at home, but in 
Italy emigration increased with the incidence of owner occupation and sharecropping. The 
differing effects of variables reflecting small holding are puzzling. A partial explanation 
might be that in countries like Italy, with high rates of return migration, emigration was often 
undertaken with the objective of acquiring land on returning home.  
It is difficult to advance much further without getting down to the local level, and in series of 
important papers Wegge (1998, 1999, 2002) studied emigration from the Hesse-Cassel region 
of Germany between 1832 and 1857. While those with resources such as land, which could 
be sold or mortgaged, would not face liquidity constraints they also had less incentive to 
move; by contrast unskilled labourers were more often constrained. As a result the highest 
emigration rates were among artisans—those with transferrable skills and enough resources 
to emigrate (Wegge, 2002).
7 Consistent with this, village level data indicates that higher 
wages and greater scarcity of land led to higher emigration. It also provides strong evidence 
that network effects were powerful; current emigration rates were strongly related to past 
emigration from the same village and from the surrounding county. In addition, those 
                                                            
7 Summarizing occupational data for ships lists Cohn (2009, Ch. 5) confirms this pattern for German immigrants 
but finds that the English, and especially the Irish, were rather less skilled than the populations from which they 
were drawn. The evidence also suggests that from around 1830 the skills of immigrants to the US declined as 
migration costs fell and mass migration accelerated.   9 
 
emigrants that could be identified as networked carried less cash with them (Wegge, 1998). 
This further supports the idea that network effects helped to unlock the poverty trap. Another 
interesting finding is that emigration was higher from villages where the custom was for one 
son to inherit rather than for the previous generation’s assets (particularly land) to be evenly 
divided among the male siblings (Wegge, 1999).  
There are three interrelated issues that remain under-explored in cliometric work on the 
causes of international migration. One is the role of politics and oppression. Some migrants 
left Europe for reasons of religious or political persecution—a parallel with today’s asylum 
seekers. Perhaps the most prominent example is the persecution of Jews that is often 
associated with the steep rise in emigration from the Russian empire after 1880. In her study 
of annual time series Platt-Boustan (2007) finds that the key events of 1891, 1903 and 1905-6 
had substantial effects on emigration in the short run but that most of the upward trend in 
emigration was due to the standard economic variables.
8 The political climate in host 
countries (such as the ebb and flow of nativist sentiment in the US) may also, at times, have 
had some influence (Cohn, 2000). Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) examine the effects of host 
country political variables across 14 countries in Europe and the New World. They find that 
immigration was positively related to political participation (democracy and suffrage) and 
also to rights for immigrants (access to citizenship, land and education). Nevertheless the 
dominant forces were the usual economic and demographic variables.  
A second issue is the choice of destination. Migrants from a given country went to a 
relatively narrow range of destinations. While the US was the main destination for most 
migrants from Europe, large numbers of British and Irish went to the British dominions and a 
large share of southern Europeans went to South American countries. It is often suggested 
that colonial ties, common language and cultural affinity meant that different destinations 
were poor substitutes (Taylor 1994), a feature that was reinforced by the friends and relatives 
effect.  Yet there were potential substitutes among the English speaking countries and within 
South America. As Green et al. (2002) show, British migrants moved between Canada and 
the US, to where their skills were best rewarded. But while migrants from northern Italy 
(more often skilled and urban) went to South America, those from the Italian South (more 
often unskilled and rural) went increasingly to the United States. This apparent paradox may 
be explained by the fact that unskilled labour commanded higher wages in the US (and 
language was less of an impediment for unskilled employment), while the more skilled 
northern Italians moved easily into business and trade in Argentina (see Klein, 1983; Baily, 
1983).  
However, attempts to identify substitution between destinations in migration equations have 
not been very successful. Analysing the destinations of emigrants across 69 Italian provinces, 
Hatton and Williamson (1998, p. 119) found that the choice between Latin America and the 
United States was driven mainly by the share and type of agricultural employment and by the 
destination choice of past emigrants.  In a recent paper, Balderas and Greenwood (2010) 
                                                            
8 These events are the expulsion of Jews from Moscow in 1891; the Kishinev massacre of 1903; and the 
pogroms that followed the riots of 1905.  10 
 
analyse times series for emigration from 12 source countries to three destinations: Argentina, 
Brazil and the USA. Like other studies they find relative wages and the migrant stock 
mattered, with mixed results for economic activity. Using instrumental variables they 
examine the effect of migration to one destination on migration to other destinations in order 
to measure the substitution effect. But they find little evidence of substitution between 
Argentina and Brazil or between either of these and the United States.  
A third issue is return migration. As Gould (1980a, p. 50) remarked: “If the immigrants came, 
as so many models assert, because of higher wages and better job opportunities in the USA 
than in Europe, why did so many go back? As obvious a question as this has been totally 
ignored by the majority of econometric studies on Pre world War One migration.” Gould’s 
question is still as apposite now as it was 30 years ago. Some migrants moved with the 
seasons
9 others timed their stay according to essentially the same variables that drove 
outward migration. Over time, return migration increased as transport costs fell and as the 
share of Southern and Eastern Europeans rose. A key indicator of the intention to return is the 
rising share of males in the outward flow (Gould, 1980a, p. 60; Hatton and Williamson 2005, 
p.  80). While there has been some analysis of the impact of return migrants (e.g. Cinel, 
1991), the data is somewhat limited and the question of why return migration varied so much 
across different source countries (and across localities) remains under-researched.  
 
Migrants in the Labour Market 
There has been a vigorous debate in the economics literature about how well or badly 
immigrants assimilate after arrival in the host country, and the main focus has been on 
earnings. On arrival, immigrants have earnings significantly lower than the native born but 
the gap narrows as they acquire host country skills and experience.   In his pioneering study 
of US immigrants in 1970 Chiswick (1978) found that male immigrant earnings converged 
on those of the native born, and even overtook them after 10-15 years of US experience. But 
others such as Borjas (1985, 1994) argued that cross sectional estimates overestimate the true 
assimilation effect if the ‘quality’ of cohorts declined over time.  
This is illustrated in Figure 1. The solid lines represent the ‘true’ age-earning profiles for 
different cohorts of immigrants and the native-born. Here the most recent arrivals, cohort 3, 
have the lowest earnings profile and the earliest arrivals, cohort 1, have the highest profile. At 
a given point in time, the most recent cohort is observed at age A3 while the oldest cohort is 
observed around age A1.  The dotted line shows what the estimated age earning profile for 
immigrants might look like when estimated from a single cross-section. The cross-sectional 
estimate generates a (somewhat misleading) steeper upward slope as the earlier cohorts have 
both higher labour market quality and longer experience in the host country. Because a cross-
section cannot distinguish between host country experience effects and cohort effects, it tends 
to overestimate the assimilation effect for any given cohort. Analysing wage data from 
                                                            
9 Those from southern Europe were known as golondrinas (swallows).  11 
 
different US censuses Borjas (1992) found that cohort quality declined by about 20 percent 
between those who arrived in 1955-60 those who arrived in 1975-80. 
There is a striking parallel between the debates over US immigrant assimilation in the 30 
years after 1970 and in the 30 years after 1880. Some late nineteenth century observers 
argued that the waves of ‘new immigrants’ arriving from Southern and Eastern Europe 
assimilated less well and had lower labour market quality than those who came earlier from 
Northwestern Europe. This view was expressed by the US Immigration Commission (the 
Dillingham Commission), which reported in 1911 after deliberating this issue for four years. 
In the recommendations of the (majority) Report it was argued that “while the American 
people, as in the past, welcome the oppressed of other lands, care should be taken that 
immigration be such, both in quality and quantity as not to make too difficult the process of 
assimilation” (Vol. 1 p. 45). Similarly in a widely circulated book, Jenks and Lauck argued of 
the new immigrants that “their general as well as their industrial progress and assimilation are 
retarded by segregation in colonies and communities where they have very little contact with 
American life and small opportunity to acquire the English language” (1926, p. 78).  
In the light of Figure 1 one might expect that cross sectional estimates of earnings function 
for natives and immigrants would give an (over) optimistic picture of immigrant assimilation. 
But several studies that exploit microdata collected by State Labor Bureaus, have come to the 
opposite conclusion. For workers in Michigan’s copper mines and in agricultural implements 
and ironworking industries around 1890, Hannon (1982a; 1982b) found that immigrant wage 
profiles were relatively flat, with at best very little convergence on the earnings of the native-
born. Eichengreen and Gemery (1986) obtained similar results for workers in Iowa in 
19884/5 and concluded that assimilation was slow, especially for those who acquired their 
skills before migration. And in his study of earnings profiles in Michigan and California, 
Hanes (1996) found that immigrant earnings growth was well below that of natives up to the 
age of about 40. However these findings seem to be the result of using a quadratic age-
earnings function. Using a more flexible functional form on the same data Hatton (1997) 
finds that immigrant earnings gradually converge on those of the native-born.
10   
Surveys from around 1890 contain relatively few new immigrants, making it difficult to 
measure their assimilation. Using grouped data on wages in 1909 reported by the Dillingham 
Commission, Blau (1980) found that male immigrants from Northwest Europe earned 12.2 
percent less than natives on arrival but caught up after 11.4 years while those from Southern 
and Eastern Europe started with a 17.8 percent disadvantage but caught up after 16.6 years. 
Using the same data source, this more optimistic picture is confirmed by Chiswick (1992) 
and Hatton (2000). Allowing for individual source-country effects, the latter finds that 
immigrant wages converged on those of the native-born by about one percent per year over 
                                                            
10 The typical age-earning profile slopes steeply upwards from the age of about 16 to 25 and then follows a 
much flatter curve. In these datasets the native-born are relatively young and so the quadratic function picks up 
the steep rise at the younger ages. By contrast, immigrants are typically older and so the quadratic estimated for 
them is much flatter. From the estimated profiles it thus appears that the earnings of natives grow faster up to 
about age 40, and then decline faster at higher ages.  12 
 
the 20 years since migration. After 20 years, those from northwest Europe earned 4.7 percent 
more than the native-born while those from Southern and Eastern Europe earned 2.9 percent 
less.  As a result of the change in the source-country composition, immigrant quality (based 
on earnings) declined by about 5 percent between 1873 and 1913 as compared with around 
25 percent between 1935-40 and 1975-80 (Hatton, 2000). Thus the shift in source 
composition before World War 1 had much less effect on the labour market performance of 
immigrants than has been the case post-World War 2.  
Evidence from the census produces a similar account for a wider range of occupations. Minns 
(2000) found that immigrant cohorts tracked across the US censuses of 1900 and 1910 
experienced the same level of upgrading as in the cross section. But particularly notable was 
the rate of movement up the occupational ladder from blue collar to white collar, especially 
among the new immigrants. This paints a rather more optimistic picture than do studies that 
concentrate only on blue collar occupations, and hence ignore a key part of upward mobility. 
But there are differences by nationality and by host country. Thus Green and MacKinnon 
(2001) find slower assimilation for British immigrants observed in the 1901 Canadian census 
than for Jews or non-whites. Clearly, occupational mobility was a key element in the 
immigrants’ assimilation process, and nowhere more so than among Russian Jews in the US 
(Chiswick, 1991). For Jews, upward movement into self-employment and small business was 
an important route and it seems to have operated more strongly for those who migrated to 
New York than for those who migrated to London (Godley 2001). Evidence for Canada 
indicates that Jews were much more likely to become self-employed than non-Jewish 
immigrants (Minns and Rizov, 2005).  
It is often argued that upward mobility is a partly a result of positive self-selection. It is 
widely believed that, on average, immigrants were healthier, more energetic and enterprising 
and had more human capital than the populations from which they were drawn. Certainly 
they had more education than non-emigrants, particularly the southern Europeans (Sánchez 
Alonso (2007, p. 414-6).
11 But other characteristics such as ability are much harder to 
measure.
12 Mokyr and Ferrie (1994) suggest that immigrants supplied a disproportionate 
number of entrepreneurs and businessmen in the US. One piece of circumstantial evidence 
comes from the labour market performance of second generation immigrants. Their outcomes 
were better than for first generation immigrants, and the evidence from wage surveys and 
from the census suggests that they often outperformed the native-born (Hatton, 1997; Minns, 
2000). An interpretation of this is that second generation immigrants inherited some of the 
characteristics of their positively selected parents but suffered less of the disadvantage faced 
by first generation immigrants.  
                                                            
11 Even more striking is the positive educational selection of immigrants from Mexico to the United States in 
1910 and 1940; despite this, Mexican immigrants still had much less education than the US-born (Feliciano, 
2001).   
12 There is some suggestion that male immigrants from Southern Italy to the US were taller than average, but 
women were shorter (Danubio et al,, 2004).   13 
 
Ferrie (1999) examined upward mobility among antebellum immigrants by matching 
individual-level data recorded in ships passenger lists and in the censuses of 1850 and 1860. 
He found that there was some downward occupational mobility on arrival, but this was 
followed by steep upward mobility, particularly for the young and literate British and German 
immigrants.  Ferrie (1999) also studied the links between the occupational and geographic 
mobility of immigrants. More than two thirds of immigrants arriving in 1840-1950 moved 
county in the subsequent decade and these moves were associated with both upward and 
downward occupational mobility. Relative to non-movers, labourers who moved location 
increased their wealth—the more so the further they moved.  The high rates of mobility 
observed among immigrants raises the further question of what determined their initial 
location.  
A number of studies have analysed the intended destination of immigrants on arrival in the 
United States at the turn of the twentieth century (Dunlevy and Gemery, 1977; Dunlevy, 
1980; 1983; Dunlevy and Saba, 1992). Regression analysis indicates that immigrants 
migrated towards states on the eastern seaboard (close to New York), towards those with 
relatively high incomes, and towards those with high population densities.  But the most 
important single influence is the location of previous immigrants from the same source 
country. The evidence indicates that geographic dispersion increased somewhat with onward 
moves (Dunlevy, 1980), but that immigrants avoided the US South (Dunlevy, 1983). A study 
of the intended destinations of Canadian immigrants in 1912 found, in addition, that they 
selected destinations and sectors that made best use of their skills (Green and Green, 1993).  
While migrants often moved to opportunity, there were nevertheless distinct regional and 
local concentrations, typically in urban areas and gateway cities and often differing by 
ethnicity.  
As immigrants chose specific locations, this raises the question of whether they crowded out 
or displaced the native-born population. Hatton and Williamson (1998, p. 168) found that 
foreign born in-migration to the Northeast States in 1880-1910 led to out-migration of the 
native born. Furthermore the effect is large: for every 100 foreign born in-migrants to a state, 
native out-migration increased by 40. Thus the westward movement of the native-born was 
not just the pull of opportunity in the west but partly an immigrant-induced push from the 
east. When the immigration to the Northeast slowed dramatically in the 1920s this process 
slowed down. Collins (1997) finds that it also quickened the movement of blacks from the 
South to the Northern States. One implication of findings like these is that, even though 
immigrants were highly concentrated, their effects on the labour market percolated 
throughout the economy.  
 
The Impact of Migration 
One of the most contentious issues in the immigration debate has been what are the economy-
wide effects of immigration and one reason it has been so contentious is because of the link 
with policy. The issues that have been debated in the historical literature can best be 14 
 
illustrated in with a textbook diagram (Figure 2). Here there are two countries (R and S) with 
combined labour force measured as the width of the box. The receiving country’s labour 
demand curve, DR, slopes down from the left and the sending country’s labour demand, DS, 
curve slopes down from the right. The initial allocation of labour in the receiving country is 
LR1 and its wage, WR1, exceeds that of the sending country, WS1. Migration from S to R 
increases the labour force in country R to LR2, so that the wage falls to WR2; in country S the 
labour force shrinks and the wage increases to WS2.  
The research questions that stem from this are as follows: First, did immigration depress real 
wages in the New World and increase them in the Old World, and if so, by how much? 
Second, how far did migration lead to convergence of wage rates between the New and Old 
Worlds? Third, are there other forces associated with migration—or with pre-1914 
globalisation more generally—that shifted labour demand curves such that they either offset 
or reinforced the partial equilibrium effects depicted in Figure 1? And finally, how far did 
immigration affect the distribution of income in the New and Old Worlds? This is illustrated 
in the diagram by recognising that the income of other (fixed) factors of production in 
country R is measured in the initial situation as the area of the triangle A,B,WR1, which after 
the migration becomes A,C,WR2.  
What was the impact of mass migration on real wage rates and on wage convergence between 
sending and receiving countries before 1914? Several different approaches have been 
employed.  Using regression analysis on annual time series for Australia for 1860-1913, Pope 
and Withers (1994) found little evidence of a negative effect of immigration on wages. 
However they used the immigrant flow to explain the wage level, whereas theory suggests 
immigrant flows should explain wage change. A similar point applies to their finding that the 
immigrant flow had no effect on the unemployment rate (Pope and Withers, 1993). Other 
studies have correlated immigration with changes in wages across locations within a country 
(the so-called spatial correlations approach). Ljungberg (1997) finds that emigration 
explained about half of the rise in wages across Swedish counties between in 1870 and 1910. 
And Goldin (1994) found a negative relationship between wage growth and immigration 
across US cities between 1890 and 1923. While this approach captures the local effects of 
immigration it may not be a good guide to the overall national effects if (as suggested above) 
there is significant interregional labour mobility in response to migration inflows. 
In their multi-country study, Taylor and Williamson (1997) first calculate the cumulative 
effect of migration on total labour supply from 1870 to 1910 in order to estimate the 
counterfactual labour force in 1910 in the absence of migration. They then use labour demand 
elasticities to estimate the effects of migration on real wages for 12 Old World countries and 
5 New World countries.
13 The effects are roughly proportional to the scale of immigration so 
                                                            
13 In these calculations the labour demand elasticities are based on the assumption that aggregate production 
functions are of Cobb-Douglas form (i.e. where the elasticity of factor substitution is -1). It is worth stressing 
that in this and most of the other studies noted below the effect of immigration wages in sending or receiving 
countries is based on the assumption that labour demand curves are downward sloping, and so the migration 
effect is not tested directly. 15 
 
that in the absence of mass migration after 1870 real wages in 1910 would have been higher 
by 27 percent in Argentina, by 17 percent in Australia and by 9 percent in the United States; 
conversely real wages would have been lower by 24 percent in Ireland, by 22 percent in Italy 
but by only 5 percent in Great Britain and 2 percent in Germany. Overall the real wage ratio 
between the New and Old Worlds fell by 11 percent, whereas under the no-migration 
counterfactual it would have increased by 10 percent (Taylor and Williamson, 1997, p. 41). 
Thus, international migration more than accounts for the observed wage convergence 
between 1970 and 1910. 
These assessments can be enriched by using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
to allow for a variety of economy-wide adjustments, although usually for only one country at 
a time. For Sweden, Karlstrom (1985) estimated that emigration up to 1890 raised the real 
wage by 9 percent, while for Norway Riis and Thonstad (1989) estimated that emigration up 
to 1910 raised income per capita by 6 percent. O’Rourke and Williamson (1995) found that 
emigration served to raise urban wages by in Sweden by 12.3 percent above what they would 
have been in its absence. Boyer et al. (1994) find that, in the absence of emigration after 
1851, Irish real wages would have been lower by between 19 and 34 percent. For Argentina, 
Taylor (1997) finds that real wages would have been 25 percent higher by 1914 in the 
absence of immigration from 1870.  O’Rourke et al. (1994) estimated that in the absence of 
emigration urban real wages would have been higher in 1910 by as much as 34 percent in the 
United States and lower by 12 percent in Britain. In terms of broad magnitudes, most of these 
figures  are consistent with those estimated using the much cruder method of applying labour 
demand elasticities to counterfactual labour force estimates, but two points are  worthy of 
note.  
The first is that the CGE models allow a rich array of adjustments. Thus in the absence of 
emigration, labour intensive sectors would have shrunk less in the Old World and would have 
expanded less in the New World. In countries like Ireland and Sweden the share of 
agriculture would have declined more slowly, especially the most labour intensive sectors.   
And since these are open economy models, adjustments also come through international 
trade. To the extent that factor intensities become more similar, migration tends to be a 
substitute for trade, and so trade grows less rapidly than it would have in the absence of 
migration. On the other hand falling transport costs stimulated trade, which served to magnify 
the real wage effects of differing labour intensities. This latter effect tended to cause 
divergence rather than convergence in real wages.   
The second is that the size of the wage effects depends critically on the assumption that is 
made about capital mobility. The results quoted above are based on the assumption that the 
capital stock in the end year in the counterfactual is the same as the observed level.  The 
models show that, in the absence of the mass migrations, rates of return on capital would 
have been much lower in the New World and much higher in the Old World. It seems likely 
that much of the capital that flowed from the Old World to the New was effectively chasing 
the higher returns brought about by migration-induced labour force growth. If those returns 
were effectively arbitraged by the international capital market, then in the absence of 16 
 
migration, capital would have retreated to Europe and rates of return would not have 
diverged.  Thus with perfectly mobile capital, the wage effects of migration are much 
smaller. To give one illustration: in the absence of emigration since 1870 the British wage in 
1910 would have been 6.6 percent lower with capital mobility as compared with 12.2 percent 
lower with no capital mobility (O’Rourke at al., 1994, p. 209).
14 This has important 
implications for wage convergence in the Atlantic economy. Taylor and Williamson (1997) 
estimate that whereas migration explains 125 percent of the observed wage convergence in 
the absence of capital adjustment, it explains ‘only’ 70 percent when capital is perfectly 
mobile.  
That there are any wage effects under capital mobility reflects the fact that there are other 
fixed factors, most importantly land. As its relative scarcity increased, land prices and rental 
rates tended to increase in the New World relative to those the Old World (O’Rourke and 
Williamson 1999, p. 179). And as land scarcity increased relative to labour in the New World 
the wage/rental ratios fell while they tended to increase in the Old World. Since the average 
landowner was richer than the average labourer these trends contributed to increasing 
inequality in the New World and decreasing inequality in the Old World. It is important to 
stress, however, that the focus is on distribution rather than on income per capita or overall 
efficiency. This is illustrated by Figure 1, where capital (which we could think of here as 
land) is assumed immobile. Considering the initial population only, the overall “immigration 
surplus” is the area of the triangle BCD, which is typically small. By contrast, the transfer 
from wage earners to land owners is the rectangle, WR1,B,D,WR2 which is much larger.
15 
As O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) show, the magnitude of these effects differed between 
countries, according to scale of migration, the structure of the economy and the reaction to 
globalisation. Thus the rise in the wage-rental ratio was more muted in the European 
countries that resorted to agricultural protection (France, Germany, Spain) than in those that 
maintained free trade. This has led to a lively debate on the distributional effects of 
globalisation before 1914. A number of studies have sought to refine the original findings 
sometimes by revising the data series. Bohlin and Larsson (2007) find that the wage 
rental/ratio in Sweden increased more slowly than previously thought, which they argue is 
due to Sweden’s turn to protectionism from 1888. Others stress regional diversity within the 
New World. Emery et al. (2007) find that the wage rental ratio fell strongly from 1880 in land 
abundant Western Canada but not in the East. This convergence within Canada was reversed 
in the period of de-globalisation from 1914. For the Australian colonies Shanahan and Wilson 
(2007) find that while New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland exhibited declining wage 
                                                            
14 For other countries the results for 1870-1910 (capital immobile versus capital mobile) are: USA: 34.0, 9.2 
(O’Rourke et al., 1994, p. 209); Argentina: 27.0, 25.0 (Taylor 1997, p.121); Ireland (from 1850):  -19, -6 (Boyer 
et al., 1994, p. 235).  
15 To give an illustration, for the immigration to the United States up to 1990, Borjas (1995, p. 8) calculated the 
loss to native-born workers would be 1.9 percent of GDP and the gain to native capital 2.0 percent of GDP, so 
that the immigration surplus is just 0.1 percent of GDP. But the overall surplus could be larger for skilled 
migration in a model that distinguishes between skilled and unskilled workers and where capital and skills are 
complements.     17 
 
rental ratios. But South Australia bucked the trend until the 1880s due to differing colonial 
land policies.  
In the debate on inequality and globalisation since the 1970s most of the focus has been on 
trends in the wage distribution.  If skilled and unskilled workers are imperfect substitutes then 
unskilled immigration should widen the wage distribution.
16 Were the effects of migration on 
wage-rental ratios and wage-income ratios before 1914 also reflected in the distribution of 
wages?  The evidence suggests that immigration before 1914 increased the share of unskilled 
labour in the US and Canada where the wage distribution widened and reduced it for Britain, 
where the wage distribution narrowed. For other countries (both sending and receiving) the 
impact of migration on the skill mix and hence on the wage distribution is less clear. In his 
counterfactual analysis Anderson (2001) finds that the wage effects were generally in the 
expected direction but that they correlate poorly with the actual ex-post changes in wage 
inequality. Clearly other factors were at work. Using regression analysis Betrán and Pons 
(2004) find that net migration increased the skill premium for the United States but narrowed 
it for France, the UK, Spain and Italy. But this effect is only observed in the presence of a 
range of other variables that represent skill biased technical change, capital intensity, 
structural change, and a range of variables reflecting labour market institutions. These results 
are qualitatively similar to those obtained from a CGE analysis of the trend in the skill 
premium for UK economy from 1880 to 1913 (Betrán and Pons 2010).  
 
Immigration Policy 
As emigration to the New World ascended to ever greater heights in the two decades before 
the First World War pressures for restricting immigration mounted. Nowhere more so than in 
the United States, which eventually imposed a literacy test in 1917 followed by the first 
immigration quota in 1921. Some observers have seen this as a policy backlash in response to 
the rise in immigration itself (Williamson, 1998); thus mass migration sowed the seeds of its 
own destruction. But what were the mechanisms involved? As Foreman Peck puts it: “The 
two key questions of any political economy of international migration are: (1) who gains and 
who loses from migration? And (2) who is in a position to do something about it? The answer 
to the first question identifies a demand for policies and that to the second reveals a policy 
supply” (1992, p. 360).  
The answer to the first question is discussed in the previous section and is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Those who competed most directly with immigrants, such as low-skilled blue collar 
workers, had the most to lose and are likely to complain the most loudly. The answer to the 
second question depends on who has the vote and what particular interest they would vote 
                                                            
16 In fact there are two issues: (a) substitutability between skill (or education) groups and (b) substitutability 
between immigrants and non-immigrants within skill groups. The latter point is reflected in the recent debate 
following Borjas (2003). For United States manufacturing in 1890, Foreman Peck (1992) found evidence of less 
than perfect substitutability between immigrants and non-immigrants, some of which may reflect differences in 
skills.     18 
 
for. As the franchise widened it typically percolated down the hierarchy of class and income 
diluting the political weight of landowners and capitalists and giving a stronger voice to 
urban unskilled labour.  As Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) show, voting rates at the turn of 
the century were about a third for adults in North America and but less than ten percent in 
South America where the Latifundia retained its grip on power. Immigration restrictions 
came earlier in the US than in the (comparably democratic) land abundant dominions partly 
due to their membership of the British Empire. In labour abundant Europe labour’s interest 
was to encourage emigration and hence the wider the franchise the less emigration was 
discouraged (Foreman Peck, 1992, p. 366-7). 
So what underlies public attitudes towards immigration?  Two candidates stand out. The first 
is that, as Figure 1 illustrates, those who compete most directly with immigrants have the 
most to lose and are likely to complain the most loudly. Low skilled workers in blue collar 
occupations, who were gaining the franchise and joining unions, would be the natural 
constituency to support restrictive immigration policy. The alternative is the cultural 
hypothesis: that the growing numbers of southern and eastern Europeans were seen as 
challenging existing cultural norms and therefore as less acceptable.
17 As the southern and 
eastern Europeans whose numbers were increasing steeply tended also to be less skilled and 
less educated, these hypotheses are (almost) observationally equivalent. Both the literacy test 
of 1917 and the quota Acts of 1921, and 1924 deliberately discriminated against these ‘new 
immigrants’.
18 
Following the literature on immigration opinion for more recent times
19, Richardson (2005) 
provides an interesting test of these hypotheses using data on opinion towards immigration 
collected by the Kansas State Labor Bureau in 1895-7. He finds that the overwhelming 
majority of workers in this blue collar sample wanted immigration to be restricted or to be 
suppressed altogether. Union members were more strongly opposed to immigration than non-
unionists and those with incomes in the middle of the range were more opposed than the 
poorest. Although increasing immigration in a locality leads to stronger opposition to 
immigration, the source-country composition of those immigrants matters much less. Hence 
the results favour the labour market competition hypothesis over the ethnic differences 
hypothesis. There is also evidence that opinion was more negative in years when 
unemployment was high. This is consistent with much of the qualitative literature that links 
the ebb and flow of anti-immigrant sentiment with business cycle conditions.
20  
                                                            
17 Just as the Irish had been regarded in the two decades after the Famine.  
18 The Emergency Quota Act (also known as the Johnson Quota Act) limited annual immigration from each 
national origin to 3 percent of the stock in the 1910 census. The Immigration Act of 1924 (the Johnson-Reed 
Act) limited the number of migrants to 2 percent of the number in the 1890 census (effective 1929). Asians 
remained excluded. For the background to legislation in this period see Daniels, 2004, Ch. 2.  
19 See for example: Mayda (2006); O’Rourke and Sinnot (2005); Dustmann and Preston (2007).  
20 It may also explain the imposition of the Emergency quota in 1921, as the unemployment rate increased from 
5.2 percent in 1920 to 11.7 in 1921. An alternative hypothesis is that with rapid growth in education in southern 
and Eastern Europe the literacy test was proving less effective than anticipated (Goldin, 1994, p. 226).  19 
 
How did anti-immigrant sentiment get translated into restrictive immigration policy? In a 
highly influential paper Goldin (1994) examines voting patterns in the US Congress. 
Beginning in 1897 a series of bills incorporating a literacy test failed to pass into law until, in 
1917, the House of Representatives and the Senate both overrode Presidents Wilson’s veto.
21 
Labour market effects seem to have been an important factor. Analysing vote for an override 
in the House in 1915 Goldin found that representatives were more likely to vote for 
restriction the more rapid the growth of the foreign-born population and slower the growth of 
wages rates in their district during the preceding years. But the higher the district’s immigrant 
density (the level, not the change) the less likely was a vote for restriction. This is consistent 
with evidence that first- and second-generation immigrants were less anti-immigration that 
the native-born (Richardson, 2005, p. 16). 
While the run up to restriction in the US has gained most of the attention there has also been 
a search for more general patterns. In other New World countries the door remained ajar for 
longer, but there is evidence that in Canada, Australia and New Zealand policy was also 
tightening. That meant reducing or eliminating inducements to immigrants, and as in the US, 
eventually imposing tests (such as the dictation test of the white Australia policy) that 
screened out migrants from less favoured sources. Timmer and Williamson (1998) developed 
an index of immigration policy in five New World countries from 1870 up to 1930. Using 
these data they found that for Argentina, Brazil, Canada and the United States tougher 
policies were associated with declining unskilled relative wages. In Argentina and Australia 
with relatively homogenous immigration streams the rising share of foreign born also led to 
increasing restriction. In Canada and the United States where immigrant origins were more 
diverse it was the rise in immigration from low wage countries, differing in ethnicity and 
religion from earlier immigrants, that helped to close the door. 
While immigration policies typically get tighter in recessions (Shughart et al., 1986), 
recessions seem to have more decisive effects when they are preceded by a gradual 
accumulation of forces that shift opinion against immigration.
22 This may help explain the 
imposition of the emergency quota in the US, as the unemployment rate increased from 5.2 
percent in 1920 to 11.7 in 1921. While the US led in the early 1920s, the door slammed shut 
in other New World countries during the Great Depression.
23 But two other factors may also 
have been important. The first is that the interwar period saw a dramatic decline in 
international capital flows. So the effect of capital mobility in muting the wage effects of 
immigration would have been smaller than before 1914 and thus we might suppose that 
                                                            
21 The Dillingham Commission had previously recommended using a literacy test to restrict immigration.  
22 A good example from a later era is the sudden abandonment of guestworker programmes (arbeitstopp) in 
Germany and other European countries at the time of the first oil price shock in 1973-4.  
23 In Canada, the mildly restrictive Immigration Acts of 1906, 1910 and 1923 were followed much tougher 
regulation in 1930 and 1931, when Orders in Council banned all new immigration except for British and 
Americans with sufficient capital or assured employment. In Australia, the White Australia Policy was 
introduced in 1901 and tightened in 1924 and 1928 and then in 1930 a £50 immigration fee was introduced. In 
New Zealand, government assistance to immigration was abandoned in 1930 and the Department of 
Immigration was closed in 1931. In newly created South Africa, the immigration laws of 1902 and 1906 (framed 
along similar lines to those of Australia) were followed in 1930 by national origins quota based on the American 
model. See Daniels (1995).  20 
 
workers would have been more opposed to immigration than in the era when capital chased 
labour (Hatton and Williamson, 2008). Second, the continuing expansion of the franchise 
gave greater voice to those at the bottom of the income distribution (Hatton and Williamson, 
2007). 
Not surprisingly international migration was dramatically lower in the interwar period as 
compared with the decades before 1914. Some of this was clearly the result of policy. Thus 
Pope (1981) found that lower immigration to Australia after 1920 could be accounted for by 
the reduction in subsidies and the tightening of eligibility. Taylor (1994) found shifts in the 
migration equations for both Australia and Argentina and Gemery (1994) found that the 
push-pull model no longer explained immigration to the United States. In the US where the 
quotas bore heavily on the ‘new immigrant’ countries, the fall was the most dramatic of all. 
However immigration declined even for source countries for which the quotas were not 
binding. During the Great Depression immigration fell even further as policy tightened more 
and as migrants were deterred by the high rates of unemployment in the New World.  It 
possible also that the declining young adult cohorts and expanding welfare states caused 
Europeans to stay at home, but such hypotheses await more formal investigation.  
The deglobalisation of the interwar period reversed many of the trends that had been 
underway since the middle of the nineteenth century. What migration there was shifted back 
from ‘new’ to ‘old’ sources; immigrant ‘quality’ increased, and the skill premium in the US 
declined as low skilled immigration plummeted (Hatton and Williamson, 2005, pp. 193-5). 
And although the skill premium also declined in European countries the decline was less 
dramatic than in the US and Canada (Anderson, 2001, p.94; Betrán and Pons, 2004, p. 39). 
More generally, wage convergence ceased and wage rental ratio stopped rising in the New 
World and falling in the Old World. One implication is that the conditions that gave rise to 
the immigration backlash were gradually reversed. These conditions ultimately provided the 
backdrop to the easing of immigration policies in the postwar period (Hatton and Williamson, 
2005, Ch. 10). In the US where the (long delayed) policy backlash was sharpest the 
resumption took longer than in other New World countries where the backlash was less 
intense.  
 
International Migration in the Third World 
The preceding sections focus exclusively on emigration from Europe to the New World, 
within what might be called the greater Atlantic economy. This has received the vast bulk of 
the attention in cliometric work on migration. Yet as McKeown (2004) points out, it accounts 
for only a third to 40 percent of long-distance international migration in the era up to 1940.
24  
Most notable were the fifty million or more migrants from labour-abundant India and South 
                                                            
24 Two caveats are appropriate here. One is that a far larger proportion of Third World transoceanic migration 
was temporary or short-term. The other is that a significant share of McKeown’s total for Asia is migration 
within the same country or landmass—notably the migrations (mainly of Chinese and Russians) to Manchuria 
and Siberia.  21 
 
China to labour-scarce regions such as Burma, Ceylon, parts of Southeast Asia, and the 
Pacific Islands as well as more distant locations on the coast of Africa, South America and 
the Caribbean.  They were largely shut out of the greater Atlantic economy, first by the costs 
of migration and, from the 1880s, by anti-Asian immigration policies. The bulk of 
intercontinental migrants from Asia travelled as indentured labourers (reflecting the high 
costs of migration), until this too was curtailed by policy. Hence the largest numbers moved 
to the primary product exporters within Asia. Not surprisingly, migration within Asia has 
received growing attention, although the cliometric literature is still relatively small.  
Were these migrations driven by the same forces that were observed in the Atlantic 
migrations? Huff and Caggiano (2007) focus on emigrants moving from India and south 
China to work on plantations in Burma, Thailand and Malaya. Using the standard push-pull 
model outlined above, they find evidence that relative wages were important, just as for 
transatlantic migration, but that proxies for labour demand are generally insignificant. This 
possibly reflects that migrants were contracted to specific sectors rather than responding to 
economy-wide labour market conditions. Except in one case the migrant stock was found to 
exert a powerful influence, something that Huff and Caggiano (2007, p. 49) attribute to the 
spread of information about opportunities for migration.
25 Just as in Europe, the regional 
origins of migrants were very unevenly distributed, with notably high rates of emigration 
from Madras in India and Fukien and Kwangtung in China. Although high-emigration 
localities were often on or near the coast, we lack detailed studies of the other factors 
involved. One interesting study of migration from different Japanese prefectures to the 
Northwest United States stresses the importance of information flows set in train by pioneer 
migrants (Murayama, 1991). It seems likely that information flows were (even) more 
important in the context of Asian emigration that they were in Europe.  
In Asia the volume of migration was often large relative to the receiving country population 
but small relative to that of the source country. Taken together, Burma, Thailand and Malaya 
received 15 million immigrants between 1881 and 1939, a figure in excess of their combined 
population in 1881. However, about fourth fifths returned, typically after a stay of three to 
five years (Huff and Caggiano, 2007, pp.38-9). Given the vast populations of India and 
China, some observers have followed W. A. Lewis in characterising them as highly elastic 
sources of labour. As a result, the wage in the Southeast Asian destinations should be pinned 
down by labour market conditions in India and China. Using cointegration and error 
correction models, Huff and Caggiano (2007; 2008) find that Indian wages in Burma and 
Malaya and Chinese wages in Thailand and Malays were strongly related to the source wage 
in the respective source countries, with little trend in the wage gap and little evidence of 
reverse causality.
26 Thus the long-run supply of labour to these booming Asian economies 
seems to have been more elastic than was the supply of European labour to the New World.  
                                                            
25 Interestingly they find that the migrant stock is not significant for Indian migration to Burma, the majority of 
whom were recruited by a kangany (head man, or gang leader). 
26 Nevertheless the absolute real wages in the destination were two to three times those at the source. Huff and 
Caggiano (2008, p. 305-6) attribute some of this to the costs of migration and relocation, but the largest 22 
 
Longer distance migrations to the plantation enclaves of the Caribbean, the Pacific and Africa 
were much smaller in magnitude and were conducted through contract or indenture (more so 
for Indians than Chinese). One reason is that the costs were much higher. Relative to the 
home wage, the cost of passage for these Indian and Chinese migrants were of the order of 
ten times those facing Europeans migrating to the New World (Hatton and Williamson, 2005, 
p. 140). The key element in migration under indentured servitude in the middle of the 
nineteenth century was the length of the contract (Northrup, 1995, pp. 115-6). The further the 
distance, the longer it took to recoup the costs of passage and recruitment, and hence the 
longer was the contract. But if the cost were high relative to the home wage so were the 
rewards. Wage ratios between destination and source in the range of five to nine for 
intercontinental migration were two to three times those for migration to Southeast Asia and 
were vastly higher than they were around the greater Atlantic economy (Hatton and 
Williamson, 2005, p. 137).      
The fall in transport costs and the export-led boom that characterised Southeast Asia 
pervaded much of the resource abundant periphery.
27 That raises two questions. First, did it 
also lead to convergence in real wages and in factor price ratios? And second, how important 
a part did migration play? Huff and Caggiano (2007) find some evidence of real wage 
convergence within Asia. However, Williamson (2002) has developed a real wage database 
for a wider range of countries of the periphery, which shows the opposite: real wage 
divergence (Hatton and Williamson, 2005, p. 146). On the other hand there is evidence of 
convergence in the wage-rental ratios from 1870 to 1940, which is largely accounted for by 
the trends in land rents.  Regression evidence indicates that wage-rental ratios were driven 
chiefly by trends in the terms of trade, as Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory would predict 
(Williamson, 2002, p. 78). Thus “either the terms of trade shocks were simply too big and 
favoured the land- and resource-abundant regions, or the net migrations were too small or 
both” (Hatton and Williamson, 2005, p. 146).  
Was there a policy backlash comparable with that in the Atlantic economy? Migration under 
indentured servitude, which had partially filled the labour supply gap left by the abolition of 
slavery, came under fire from the middle of the nineteenth century. On the fringes of the 
Atlantic economy, where there was potential competition with workers of European origin, it 
was fiercely opposed and severely restricted. But it survived longer in island economies like 
those of the West Indies, Mauritius, Reunion and Fiji, until the Indian trade was finally 
abolished by Britain in 1916 and in India itself a few years later. But by that time it has been 
in decline for two or three decades mainly because the deteriorating terms of trade reduced 
the demand for migrant labour (Hatton and Williamson, 2005, p. 150). Closer to home, a 
dramatic tightening of policy took place in Southeast Asia in the 1930s as export markets 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
component was due to the ‘universal stipulation’ among migrants to accumulate savings and to send back 
remittances.  
27 In addition to Southeast Asia (Burma. Java, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Straits settlements), it 
embraced South Asia (Assam, the Punjab, and Ceylon), tropical and semitropical Latin America (the Caribbean, 
the Brazilian northeast, British and French Guyana, and coastal Peru),  North Africa, East Africa and the Indian 
ocean (Egypt, Kenya Mauritius, Natal and Reunion).  23 
 
collapsed. For example, Thailand introduced a literacy test and costly residence permits in 
1932. And in Malaya, where unemployment fell disproportionately on immigrants, the 
government embarked on a massive policy of subsidised repatriation (Huff, 2001). Thus 
although there are parallels with the Atlantic economy in the timing of restriction, it does not 
seem to have been driven by quite the same long run forces.  
Conclusion  
The cliometrics of international migration has been a vibrant research area for the last three 
decades. And while it has borrowed extensively from the parallel literature in economics it 
has examined a range of experience that has placed some of the issues studied by economists 
in sharper relief would otherwise be possible. For example it offers the opportunity to assess 
the determinants of migration largely free of restrictive immigration policies and it offers a 
valuable testing ground for the political economy of immigration policy. But the cliometric 
literature is patchy; the debate is most lively, and the literature is densest, where the available 
data is richest. For that reason, if not for others, the bulk of research has focused on the rise 
and fall of mass migration in the greater Atlantic economy, and especially on immigration to 
the United States.  Countries in regions such as Latin America and Eastern Europe have 
received rather less attention. But one of the triumphs of recent research is to provide an 
integrated, multi-country view of the causes and effects of mass migration in the Atlantic 
economy as a whole. By contrast migration in Asia and elsewhere in the periphery has 
remained underdeveloped, notwithstanding the efforts of a number of pioneering scholars. No 
doubt we shall see more on that topic in the future. 24 
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Figure 1: Immigrant and Native Age Earning Profiles 
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Figure 2: The Economic Effects of Migration    
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